[QUESTION 2: WHETHER LOGIC IS A COMMON SCIENCE]

1. We ask whether logic is a common science (*scientia communis*).

**It seems not:**

For the commonality of a science is from the commonality of its subject[[1]](#footnote-1); [but] the subject of logic is distinct from the subjects of other sciences.

1. **The opposite** is argued by Boethius[[2]](#footnote-2):

'Logic treats of second intentions applied to first [intentions]'; but these are applicable to *all* first [intentions].

1. **We must say that** a science is called common from its subject. And so 'common' can be understood in two ways: either that the subject is predicable of the subjects of other sciences; or that the subject is used by other sciences.
2. Logic is not common in the first way except perhaps accidentally, if its subject is applicable to all [spheres]. In the second way it is common.

1. **Aristot.,** *Anal. Post.* I c. 28 t. 179 (AL IV2 151; **A** c. 28, 87*a* 38-87*b* 4); cf. **Thomas,** *Expos. libri Post.* I lect. 20 (I2 75): “...logic will concern what is common to all, i.e. intentions of reason, which pertain to all things; But it is not that logic has those common reasons themselves as subjects... But even if the part of logic that is demonstrative is turned toward common intentions *qua* teaching (*docendo*), the *use* of a demonstrative science still does not proceed from these common intentions”. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. More likely **Avicenna**, *Metaph.* I c. 2 (AviL 10): “Intentions understood secondarily (*intentiones intellectae secundo*), which are added to intentions understood firstly (*quae apponuntur intentionibus intellectis primo*), are, as you knew, the subject of logic...” [↑](#footnote-ref-2)